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THE LAWYER AS AGENT
Deborah A. DeMott*
INTRODUCTION
T BE law of agency provides the foundational structure for many of
the legal consequences that follow from the relationship between
a lawyer and a client, as well as the relationship between an individual
lawyer and a law firm. Definitional precision in the law aside, the
lawyer-client relationship is a commonsensical illustration of agency.
A lawyer acts on behalf of the client, representing the client, with con-
sequences that bind the client. Lawyers act as clients' agents in trans-
actional settings as well as in litigation. Moreover, a lawyer who is a
member of a law firm acts as an agent of the firm in firm-related activ-
ity, as does an associate employed by a law firm and in-house counsel
for a client organization. It is unsurprising, then, that the legal conse-
quences of these relationships parallel the legal consequences of
agency generally, even when they are not identical. In any agency
relationship, for example, the agent's loyalty to the interests of the
principal is a dominant concern, as is the loyalty of a lawyer to the
client.
Despite its foundational significance, the law of agency does not by
itself capture all of the legal consequences of relationships between
lawyers and clients and between lawyers and others to whom the law-
yer owes duties. In this context, agency is roughly comparable to the
structural steel members that support a building and define its size
and basic shape but do not govern how the building functions and
looks. Lawyers are agents, but lawyers perform functions that distin-
guish them from most other agents. That a lawyer is an agent is some-
times irrelevant to the legal consequences of what the lawyer has done
or has failed to do, making an unswerving focus on agency misleading.
It is not surprising, then, that courts on occasion differentiate among
agency's consequences, rather than according agency a monolithic or
inexorable set of consequences.
Lawyers are more than their clients' agents. Lawyers are officers of
the court, thus subjecting themselves to the court's supervision and to
duties geared to protect the vigor, fairness, and integrity of processes
of litigation. Furthermore, as members of a profession, lawyers are
subject to duties not neatly captured by the consequences of agency.
* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. For their thoughtful com-
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Although this essay is far from comprehensive, its objective is to
illustrate both the significance of agency and its limitations. A helpful
starting point is to clarify the content and legal consequences of
agency. Courts and commentators at times use the language of agency
but do not fully address the consequences that agency concepts may
carry. Moreover, the widespread use of agency terminology in aca-
demic disciplines like economics, philosophy, and literary studies does
not necessarily parallel the content of the common law of agency. I
undertake first to survey the definition and basic legal consequences
of agency to illustrate its foundational significance as applied to law-
yers. I turn next to a few illustrations of divergence between the gen-
eral law of agency and the duties of lawyers. I conclude with an
analysis of the circumstances under which a lawyer might be liable in
connection with fraud perpetrated by the lawyer's client. This illustra-
tion brings to bear principles of agency law to test their applicability
and meaning as applied to relationships that involve lawyers.
I. DEFINITION AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCES
A. Agency Defined
It is important to distinguish between the elements that must be
present in a relationship to characterize it as one of agency and the
legal consequences that follow from this characterization. Confusion
and circularity result if analysis proceeds in the opposite direction.'
As defined by the Restatement (Second) of Agency, "[a]gency is the
fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by
one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject
to his control, and consent by the other so to act."2 Thus, the defining
elements of the relationship are mutual manifestation of consent, the
agent's undertaking to act on behalf of the principal,3 and the princi-
1. In contrast, it is not helpful to examine whether a specific legal consequence of
agency is present in a particular relationship to determine whether it is a relationship
of agency. The principal consequence of agency is that the agent has power "to alter
the legal relations between the principal and third persons and between the principal
and himself." Restatement (Second) of Agency § 12 (1958). It is circular to argue that
a given actor is not an agent because the actor lacks such a power. For a further
discussion of this point, see infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
2. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1958). The relationship between a law-
yer and a client can also arise from circumstances not encompassed by this definition.
See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 26 (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 1996) (stating that lawyer-client relationships may be created by estoppel or by
court appointment).
3. It is arguable that the "fiduciary" label in the Restatement definition is not a
definitional element but instead connotes legal consequences. "Fiduciary" may have
work to do in the definition to the extent that it helps to distinguish agency from other
situations in which one person acts on behalf of another and is subject to the other's
control. For example, a supervisory employee has immediate control over lower-level
employees, who work "for" the supervisor. The lower-level employees, though, do
not owe a duty of loyalty to their supervisor. These employees, along with the super-
visor, are co-employees and co-agents of their common employer. Thus the "fiduci-
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pal's right to control the agent. The relationship between a lawyer
and a client is generally assumed by courts4 and commentators5 to be
an agency relationship and therefore a relationship in which these de-
fining elements are present.
It is worth considering whether the third element-the principal's
right to control the agent-reflects the reality of many relationships
between lawyers and their clients. Many lawyers, especially in litiga-
tion settings, make decisions with significant consequences for the cli-
ent without the client's knowledge or assent. In addition, many clients
lack the expertise to supervise the lawyer's actions because the client
will not understand their import and will be unable to detect errors
made by the lawyer.6
An important starting point is the realization that the law of agency
contains its own definition of control. The concept of control as de-
fined by agency is not the same as a generalized capacity to monitor or
the actual exercise of influence. In agency, "control" means prescrib-
ing on an ongoing basis what the agent shall or shall not do. Much in
the common law of agency turns on the distinction between a right of
control and the actual exercise of control. For example, a shareholder
who owns all of the stock in a corporation, and thus has the power to
elect all of the corporation's directors, is not simply by virtue of that
fact a principal in an agency relationship with the corporation or with
ary" language may help narrow the meaning of other language in the definition. The
language is also used in the long-established definition of a trust:
[A trust is] a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, arising as a re-
sult of a manifestation of an intention to create that relationship and subject-
ing the person who holds title to the property to duties to deal with it for the
benefit of charity or for one or more persons, at least one of whom is not the
sole trustee.
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996).
4. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962) (affirming the district
court's dismissal of the action when petitioner's lawyer failed without reasonable ex-
cuse to appear for pretrial conference and noting that "[petitioner voluntarily chose
this attorney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the conse-
quences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent").
5. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 14 cmt. b (1958) (characterizing law-
yers as "recognized agents"); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers ch.
2, Introductory Note (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (stating that the lawYer-client
relationship is "from one point of view, derived from the law of agency," although the
nature of the relationship warrants safeguards beyond those generally provided to
principals); Stephen Gillers, Regulation of Lawyers 60 (5th ed. 1998) (-La°vyers are
their clients' agents. The law of agency therefore applies to the client-lawyer
relationship.").
6. Cf. William R. Mureiko, The Agency Theory of the Attorney-Client Relation-
ship: An Improper Justification for Holding Clients Responsible for Their Attorneys'
Procedural Errors, 1988 Duke LJ. 733, 734 (criticizing, in particular, Link v. Wabash
R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962), for the Court's use of the agency theory to hold clients
responsible for the procedural errors of their attorneys). Mureiko distinguishes be-
tween procedural and substantive conduct and proposes that courts hold clients ac-
countable for litigation-related sanctions only after pinpointing fault and evaluating
relevant policy concerns. See id.
1998]
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its directors, nor is an employee of the corporation an agent of the
shareholder simply as a consequence of the shareholding. A right to
exercise control is not the same as the capacity to exercise influence or
dominance. Moreover, the shareholder has the right to exercise con-
trol only through the indirect mechanism of electing and removing the
corporation's directors, or threatening removal if directors do not ac-
cede to the shareholder's wishes. Similarly, the fact that a right of
control is not exercised does not mean that it does not exist. Indeed,
under the common law of agency, a principal who has agreed not to
exercise control nonetheless retains the power to do so. Unless the
agent resigns, the agent has a duty to obey a reasonable instruction
from the principal.7
In many agency relationships, the principal's expertise is inferior to
that of the agent and the principal exercises control by selecting a par-
ticular agent, defining the scope and objectives of the agent's reten-
tion. and determining how to compensate the agent. Lawyer-client
relationships thus are not unique. What calls the client's right of con-
trol into question is a conception of the role or status of the lawyer
that accords a lawyer, once retained, with autonomous discretion over
all important aspects of the matter, completely beyond client direc-
tion.8 For starters, this conception is not an accurate depiction of the
texture of many contemporary lawyers' relationships with their cli-
ents. An aggressive general counsel of a corporation, for example,
may retain outside law firms and subsequently keep them on the tight-
est of leashes. In circumstances in which the conception is more accu-
7. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 14 cmt. b (1958). The principal's asser-
tion of directions breaches the principal's agreement with the agent. To recover in an
action against the principal for breach of contract, the agent would need to show
damage or succeed in characterizing the principal's conduct as a constructive dis-
charge. In a nonagency relationship, in which no right of control is present, one party
does not have the right to give interim instructions to the other. Thus, one who con-
tracts to sell goods or services to a purchaser in a nonagency relationship may ignore
interim directions from the purchaser and may sue the purchaser for breach of con-
tract if the purchaser refuses to pay for goods or services that conform to the terms of
the contract. In contrast, if an agent ignores interim instructions, then the principal
has the power to terminate the agency. See id. § 118. The principal's termination may
constitute a breach of contract if the parties' agreement assures the agent of contin-
ued employment. See id. § 118 cmt. c. The termination is privileged, however, and not
a breach of contract if the agent commits a serious breach of the agent's duty of
loyalty or of a duty of obedience. See id. § 409.
8. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers ch. 2, Topic 3, Intro-
ductory Note (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) ("Traditionally, some lawyers con-
sidered that a client put affairs in the lawyer's hands, who then managed them as the
lawyer thought would best advance the client's interests."). For a discussion of the
traditional conception and empirical tests of its consequences, see Douglas E. Rosen-
thal, Lawyer and Client: Who's In Charge? (1977). If the lawyer's exercise of discre-
tion is totally beyond client direction, then the lawyer's position is in effect
comparable to that of a trustee and not an agent. Technically, of course, the lawyer is
not a trustee unless the lawyer holds title to property for the client. See Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 14B (1958).
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rate-for example, the relationship between an illiterate and naive
injured person and a lawyer representing the person on a contingent
fee basis-control is exercised as an initial matter when the client re-
tains the lawyer and defines the scope of the representation. Thereaf-
ter, the lawyer has a duty, grounded in both the law of agency and
professional norms, to keep the client informed about the status of the
matter and to consult with the client to best determine the course of
action that serves the client's interests.9 And some decisions-
whether to settle and whether to appeal, how a criminal defendant
should plead, and whether a criminal defendant should testify or
waive jury trial-are the client's to make unless the client has author-
ized the lawyer to make the particular decision, regardless of any prior
or general grant of authority from the client to the lawyer."
To be sure, the client's right of control does not trump the conse-
quences of the lawyer's position as an officer of the court and a pro-
fessional subject to profession-defined norms and discipline. To some
extent, lawyers are no different from other agents in this respect. Act-
ing as an agent is not a privilege to commit torts, crimes, and other
forms of misconduct. That is, all agents are subject to legal limits on
acts that may be done rightfully on behalf of a principal. Particular
types of agents are subject to legal and professional constraints spe-
cific to defined agency roles. Lawyers are comparable in this respect
to securities brokers and real estate agents, agents who act on behalf
of clients subject to significant regulatory and legal constraints.
What is open to serious dispute is the import of the duties a lawyer
owes to the court, coupled with the consequences of the court's power
to supervise and sanction lawyers. In contrast to regulatory regimes
applicable to other types of agents, like securities brokers and real
estate agents, in the litigation context the relationship between a law-
yer and the court is direct and immediate. Concurrently with the law-
yer's representation of the client, the lawyer owes duties directly to
the court, such as the duty to disclose controlling authority directly
adverse to the client's position that is not disclosed by opposing coun-
9. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.4 (1995); Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 31 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1. 1996). The
Restatement and the Model Rules diverge somewhat. Model Rule 1.2(a) seems to
give the lawyer control over the "means" with which to fulfill the objectives of repre-
sentation as determined by the client, subject to a duty to consult with the client. The
Restatement narrows control over "means" by recognizing that the lawyer and the
client may strike an agreement allocating authority. See Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers § 32(1) & cmt. c.
10. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 33. This essay does
not address the questions that arise when an insurer designates a lawyer to represent
its insured under a liability insurance policy obliging the insurer to indemnify and
provide a defense to the insured. For a treatment of these relationships, in which it is
often the insurer who controls the defense, selects and instructs counsel, and deter-
mines whether to settle, see Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
§ 215 cmt. f (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 1998).
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sel.11 This dimension of the lawyer's position is beyond the explana-
tory framework that agency supplies. Moreover, although the lawyer
owes duties to both the client and the court, the lawyer is not a dual
agent. The lawyer is not the court's agent, even metaphorically, be-
cause the lawyer's acts do not bind the court. Additionally, much of
the justification for the duties any agent owes the principal stems from
the mutual consent of the parties to the relationship. In contrast, the
duties the lawyer owes the court, as well as the court's inherent sanc-
tioning powers, are grounded in the nature of judicial institutions.'
Furthermore, lawyers are distinctive as agents as a consequence of
the robust professional culture and standards that define a lawyer's
professional identity. Professional standards create duties that are not
necessarily enforceable by the lawyer's client. 3 Additionally, the self-
regulatory nature of the legal profession distinguishes lawyers from
many other types of agents because it situates significant monitoring
within institutions constituted by the profession, distinct from state-
created regulatory bodies, and distinct from courts. 4 Like the law-
yer's relationship to the court, the lawyer's membership in a self-regu-
lating profession limits the reach of the lawyer's agency relationship
with the client as the source of the client's rights and the lawyer's obli-
gations. In any event, most of the time, the lawyer's responsibilities
are harmonious regardless of their source.' 5
B. Legal Consequences of Agency
Any agency relationship carries legal consequences that are inward-
looking and applicable to the rights and duties as between the agent
and the principal, as well as outward-looking consequences applicable
to the agent's interactions with third parties. On both fronts, the con-
sequences are limited to the scope of the relationship. Agency defines
11. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(a)(3).
12. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (discussing the nature ofjudicial institutions). The court's view of its responsibility may extend to the conduct
of lawyers not admitted to practice before the court. See Paramount Communications
Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 52-57 (Del. 1993) (ordering that the miscon-
duct at a deposition of a lawyer not admitted to the Delaware bar, and not admitted
pro hac vice, would prohibit the lawyer's future appearance in a Delaware proceeding
unless the lawyer voluntarily appeared before the court to explain his misconduct).
13. This disjunction is especially striking in a few jurisdictions that do not permit
reference to professional rules in testimony in legal malpractice actions. See Hizey v.
Carpenter, 830 P.2d 646 (Wash. 1992). Even such jurisdictions may be influenced by
professional rules in determining what duties a lawyer owes a client.
14. Lawyers' professional duties include those geared to further the efficacy of
professional self-regulation, such as the duty to report knowledge of another lawyer's
professional misconduct that raises a substantial question as to the lawyer's "honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer." Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
8.3(a). Even court action to impose discipline involves the decisions of lawyers-thejudges-and the rules promulgated by the court are influenced by the American Bar
Association's Model Rules.
15. See id. pmbl. T 7.
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the concept of scope through doctrines of actual authority, apparent
authority, and ratification.
The inward-looking consequences of agency are, of course, to a
great extent specified by agreement between the agent and the princi-
pal. But agency also carries consequences that go beyond express and
implied-in-fact agreements. As a fiduciary, an agent owes duties of
loyalty to the principal, which encompass more specific constraints on
self-dealing, representation of adverse interests, competition, and the
use of information acquired in connection with the agency. The
agent's fiduciary position, moreover, obliges the agent to interpret the
principal's instructions reasonably, in light of facts that the agent
knows or should know at the time the agent acts, and consistently with
the principal's interests and objectives made known to the agent. It
will often be reasonable for the agent to ask the principal to clarify
instructions that are ambiguous or incomplete. This aspect of the
agent's fiduciary position facilitates the principal's exercise of the right
to control the agent. An agency relationship also creates rights of in-
demnity that may be asserted by the agent against the principal, or the
principal against the agent, in circumstances in which a loss is suffered
as a consequence of the relationship.
On the other hand, the outward-looking consequences of agency
are linked to the agent's agreement with the principal but range well
beyond it. The outward-looking consequences of agency begin with
imputation to the principal of knowledge the agent receives or notifi-
cations given to the agent by third parties. The agent's knowledge
imputes to the principal when the agent acquires it while acting within
the scope of the agent's actual authority-that is, when the agent rea-
sonably understands the act to have been authorized by the principal.
This is also true when the agent acts with apparent authority-that is,
when a third party reasonably believes the principal has authorized
the agent to act in a particular way. Significantly, imputation works
only upward in an agency chain. That is, the principal's knowledge
does not impute downward to the agent. Although the agent has a
duty to impart knowledge to the principal, the principal does not owe
a counterpart duty to the agent. As the active party in the relation-
ship, the agent is obliged to act on the basis of knowledge that the
agent has. The state of the agent's knowledge, not the principal's di-
rect knowledge, shapes the agent's interactions with third parties,
whether the agent is diligent and alert or slothful and lazy. The ab-
sence of downward imputation means that an agent may be the inno-
cent dupe of a principal who is minded to defraud a third party
because the principal's knowledge and culpable state of mind do not
impute downward to the agent.'6
16. See Ago v. Begg, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 613, 617-18 (D.D.C. 1988) (concluding that
the knowledge of a real estate purchaser is not imputed to the purchaser's agent).
1998]
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Within the scope of the agent's actual and apparent authority, the
agent's acts bind the principal. Negligent acts of the agent bind the
principal, as does speech by an agent authorized or apparently author-
ized to speak on the principal's behalf. Disputes over the extent of
lawyers' authority arise in connection with litigation as well as transac-
tionally-oriented activity. Whether a lawyer had authority to bind the
client to a settlement negotiated by the lawyer is often in dispute.
Courts differentiate between authority to negotiate and authority to
commit to or execute a settlement agreement. For example, that a
lawyer has authority to negotiate a settlement does not create implied
authority to execute the settlement on the client's behalf or to commit
the client to do so."v A third party's belief that the lawyer had author-
ity to commit or execute is not protected by the doctrine of apparent
authority unless the belief is traceable to expressive conduct attributa-
ble to the client. Contemporary cases recognize the wide variety of
ways in which a principal may make a manifestation to a third party
regarding an agent's authority. Thus, direct statements to third parties
are not the only way in which a client might create apparent authority.
For example, in Carr v. Runyan, the Seventh Circuit held that by send-
ing a lawyer to a court-ordered mediation requiring parties to appear
in person or by a representative with full settlement authority, the cli-
ent caused the other parties to believe that the lawyer had authority to
agree to a settlement.'" Disputes over settlement aside, lawyers com-
monly bind their clients through statements made in litigation 19 and in
transactional settings.2 °
These basic propositions obviously encompass many of the legal
consequences of the lawyer-client relationship. Within the scope of
the representation, what the lawyer knows the client is deemed to
know, and the lawyer's acts bind the client so long as the lawyer acts
with actual or apparent authority. The lawyer's duties to the client,
like the client's to the lawyer, are grounded in agency. Agency princi-
ples also reach the relationship between an individual lawyer and a
law firm, specifying when the lawyer's acts bind the firm and underly-
ing the lawyer's duties to the firm.
Agency questions become especially intriguing when more than one
agency relationship is afoot, a common circumstance for lawyers.
Multiple agencies, focused on the same agent, create multiple chains
of imputation, attribution, and duties. Multiple agency chains may
17. See Auvil v. Grafton Homes, Inc., 92 F.3d 226, 230 (4th Cir. 1996) (applying
West Virginia law).
18. 89 F.3d 327, 332 (7th Cir. 1996).
19. See, e.g., People v. Cruz, 643 N.E.2d 636, 665 (Ill. 1994) (holding that a lawyer
may make an evidentiary admission against a client during trial).
20. See, e.g., Diversified Dev. & Inv., Inc. v. Heil, 889 P.2d 1212, 1221 (N.M. 1995)
(concluding that a lawyer negotiating on behalf of a property owner had apparent
authority to communicate the owner's position on a proposed extension of option,
even though the lawyer lacked authority to decide whether to grant the extension).
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run parallel or may intersect and create conflicting duties to one de-
gree or another. A lawyer with more than one client, either at the
same time or sequentially, is an agent with multiple principals, each
owed distinct duties, which the lawyer may or may not be able to ful-
fill. Separately, a lawyer who is a member or an associate in a firm is
the firm's agent as well as the client's agent. Most of the time, duties
owed to the firm do not conflict with those owed to the client. The
firm, after all, is responsible for the quality of its member or associ-
ate's work in serving clients. Indeed, in Kramer v. Nowak, the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania held that a law firm had a cause of action
against its associate for losses the firm sustained due to the associate's
malpractice.2 The associate's position as an agent of the firm, which
triggered the associate's duty to indemnify the firm,2z did not conflict
with the associate's duty to the client.23 If anything, the prospect of
being sued by the firm should augment the associate's performance of
duties owed to clients.
It is well within the reach of imagination that the duties might con-
flict. Consider the plight of A, an associate in a law firm, who is di-
rected by the firm to reallocate energies away from A's low-revenue
clients toward high-revenue clients, thereby compromising the quality
of A's work to the low-revenue clients' detriment.24 Assuming that
A's clients are the firm's clients as well, the firm has traded off its
reputational and financial interest in the quality of work done under
its auspices in order to maximize profit in the immediate term. As the
law firm's agent, A has a duty of obedience to comply with its instruc-
tions. As the clients' agent, though, A also has a duty to use reason-
able care in representing them. 5 The law firm may foolishly
misperceive its long-term interests, as well as its duties, but at the time
of its directive to A, the firm's perception of its interests does not
coincide with the interests of A's clients. The time of the directive is
also the time for A to leave the firm if the directive remains in effect
and is enforced, for complying with the firm's directive is not a de-
fense to A's malpractice 6 or to professional sanctions against AP
21. 908 F. Supp. 1281, 1292 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
22. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 401 (1958) (stating that an agent is
liable to a principal for any losses that the agent's breach of duty may cause the
principal).
23. See Nowak, 908 F. Supp. at 1289-92.
24. For the Nowak court's outline of this scenario, see id. at 1292.
25. A's professionally-defined duties begin with an obligation of competent repre-
sentation. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.1 (1995).
26. See Leonard Gross, Ethical Problems of Law Firm Associates, 26 Wm. & Mary
L. Rev. 259, 304 (1985).
27. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.2. The example presupposes
that the law firm's directive to the associate is not arguably correct in its import for
the associate's ability to fulfill the associate's-and the firm's-duties owed to clients.
In contrast, the Model Rules also state that the subordinate lawyer is not subject to
professional discipline if the violation occurs as a result of obedience to -a supervisory
19981 309
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Within agency generally, a subordinate agent within a hierarchical
chain of agents who breaches a duty the agent owes to a third party is
not shielded from liability to the third party because the agent com-
plied with instructions from a superior agent.2 8 A further illustration
of this general principle in the law firm context is the employee who
accedes to a partner's request to notarize a signature without taking
steps reasonably calculated to insure its genuineness.2 9 It is no de-
fense to the notary's negligence that it resulted from following an or-
der or request within a hierarchical work environment. One point of
reconciliation among these conflicting duties is of particular salience
in the employment context but not necessarily limited to it. Jurisdic-
tions generally accept the proposition that, even if an employee is an
employee at will, an employer still does not have the right to termi-
nate an employee simply because the employee refuses to commit a
crime or to violate a regulatory requirement. 31 In the law firm con-
text, Wieder v. Skala3 characterized the associate's duty to comply
with professional norms as an implied term in the associate's contract
of employment with the law firm.32 In Wieder, the New York Court of
Appeals held that the firm would breach its employment contract with
the associate by terminating the associate for complying with a profes-
sional norm. 33 Wieder is consistent with the general principle of
lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty." Id. Rule
5.2(b).
28. In the scenario discussed in the text, it is important to note that the
subordinate agent-A, the associate-owes both the duties of an agent to the client
and the duties of an agent to the law firm. An agent is generally not liable for eco-
nomic loss suffered by third parties as a consequence of the agent's breach of duties
owed to the principal. See Coker v. Dollar, 846 F.2d 1302 (11th Cir. 1988); Restate-
ment (Second) of Agency § 357 (1958). An agent is liable for physical harm to third
persons and their possessions when there is reliance on the agent's performance of
duties owed to the principal. See Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 353-54. Within
a law firm context, a client of the firm becomes the client of an associate if the associ-
ate does work on the client's behalf, knowing the client's identity. The associate is the
law firm's subagent. See id. § 428(1) (stating that a subagent who knows the identity
of the ultimate principal owes the same duties to the principal that the agent owes).
Moreover, it is arguable that any client is the client of all lawyers in the firm, at least
in the absence of a negotiated agreement of limited representation. See John Leub-
sdorf, Pluralizing the Client-Lawyer Relationship, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 825, 833 (1992).
29. See Villanueva v. Brown, 103 F.3d 1128, 1137 (3d Cir. 1997).
30. See, e.g., Sides v. Duke Hosp., 328 S.E.2d 818, 828 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (hold-
ing that the complaint stated a cause of action alleging that a nurse-anesthetist was
fired following her refusal to commit perjury).
31. 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992).
32. See id. at 108; see also Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga, P.C., 688 N.E.2d 813 (IIl.
App. Ct. 1997) (holding that an attorney may sue his law firm employer for retaliatory
discharge), appeal allowed, 698 N.E.2d 543 (Ill. 1998). But see Bohatch v. Butler &
Binion, No. 95-0934, 1998 WL 19482 (Tex. Jan. 22, 1998) (holding that a law firm
breached neither its partnership agreement nor its fiduciary duty in expelling a part-
ner who in good faith accused a fellow partner of overbilling a client).
33. See Wieder, 609 N.E.2d at 110. In Wieder, the termination followed the associ-
ate's demand that the firm report to disciplinary authorities the negligence of a fellow
associate who did personal legal work for the terminated associate. Id. at 106.
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agency that, although a principal always has the power to terminate
the agent's authority, the principal is liable to the terminated agent for
breach of contract if the termination contravenes a contract between
the principal and the agent.34
II. LAWYERS AS DISTINCTIVE AGENTS
The law of agency generally has sufficient flexibility to acknowledge
that agents are not identically situated. Lawyers are distinct from
other agents in the duties applicable to them, given the lawyer's posi-
tion as an officer of the court and as a member of a self-regulating
profession. In this portion of the essay I explore three illustrations of
this general point. Lawyers owe significant duties to a larger cast of
characters than do many other agents, for whom the law of agency
more crisply delimits duty. Separately, the content of the duty a law-
yer owes a client differs from the content of the duty owed principals
by nonlawyer agents. In particular, the lawyer's duty of loyalty is less
susceptible to variation or reduction through the mechanism of the
client's consent, and the lawyer bears greater responsibility to identify
and protect the client's interests than do agents generally. Finally, the
public context of litigation implicates values beyond those reflected in
the law of agency more generally, unleashing as it does the coercive
power of the state. More is at stake than in many relationships gov-
erned by the general law of agency.
A. The Wider Cast of Characters
As noted above, agency does not furnish a protective shield for an
agent who commits a tort or a crime, even if so instructed or author-
ized by the agent's principal.35 Moreover, in a transactional setting,
an agent who acts outside of the scope of authority conferred by the
principal and purports to bind the principal impliedly warrants that
the agent has authority to bind the principal.3 6 An unauthorized
transaction breaches the warranty, thereby creating liability for the
agent.3 7 And an agent who transacts on behalf of an undisclosed prin-
cipal-that is, an agent who appears to be a principal-is a party to
any contract with the third party." Thus, all agents owe duties in ad-
dition to, or beyond, the duties owed to principals.
What differentiates lawyers from the general run of agents is the
nature of the duties a lawyer owes to nonclients. To some extent this
34. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 118 cmt. c (1958).
35. See id § 343.
36. See id. § 329.
37. See id. The agent's liability includes the third party's expectation losses as well
as out-of-pocket loss. See id § 329 cmt. j. If the agent tortiously misrepresented au-
thority, then the third party who relies on the misrepresentation has a tort claim
against the agent. See id. § 330.
38. See id § 322.
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difference is the consequence of the breadth of circumstances, many
of them ambiguous, in which a lawyer-client relationship may arise. A
lawyer who negligently renders advice is liable to an advisee who
seeks legal advice when it should be reasonably foreseeable to the
lawyer that negligently-given advice will injure the advisee, even if the
lawyer is not paid for the advice and the parties have no retention
agreement.39 Additionally, a lawyer's duties extend to persons who
eventually become clients and encompass the preceding relationship
when the client is still a prospective client.
The distinctiveness of lawyers' duties is also a consequence of the
lawyer's receipt of confidential information from prospective clients
as well as from persons who never become clients. A lawyer's duties
to a prospective client-a person who discusses the prospect of form-
ing a lawyer-client relationship with the lawyer-include a duty to
protect confidential information revealed to the lawyer.40 The law-
yer's fiduciary obligation also protects a person who reveals confiden-
tial information to a lawyer in the reasonable belief that the lawyer
acts on the person's behalf, even when the application of agency prin-
ciples would dictate the conclusion that no lawyer-client relationship
resulted.
For example, in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 4 1
the Seventh Circuit disqualified a law firm from representing a plain-
tiff in an antitrust action against oil company defendants because the
defendants, as members of a trade association, had revealed confiden-
tial information to the same law firm, which represented the trade as-
sociation in lobbying activity.42 Westinghouse thus recognizes that a
lawyer may owe a fiduciary obligation to a person in the absence of a
formal or express lawyer-client relationship.43 On the facts of West-
inghouse itself, the oil companies did not request that the firm act as
their lawyer and the law firm did not consent to do so. But if the oil
companies reasonably believed the law firm represented both them
and their trade association, then an implied lawyer-client relationship
may have arisen.44 Whether circumstances nurture the creation of
such an implied relationship, or for that matter a fiduciary obligation,
depends on the reasonableness of the nonlawyer's belief, itself a func-
tion of more generalized assumptions about and expectations of a
member of a profession.
In contrast, the general law of agency draws a sharper line between
the interests of principals and other third parties and delineates with
39. See Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 693 (Minn.
1980).
40. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 27 (Tentative Draft
No. 5, 1992).
41. 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978).
42. See id. at 1311.
43. See id. at 1317.
44. See id. at 1321.
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greater precision and restrictiveness the circumstances under which an
agency relationship is formed. The prospective principal's consent to
the relationship is requisite, while, as noted above, a lawyer's lack of
consent is not fatal to the formation of a lawyer-client relationship.
The general law of agency also draws a sharper starting line for the
inception of an agent's duties. As a general matter, a prospective
agent does not owe a fiduciary duty to a prospective principal. A ma-
jor implication is that the prospective agent is not subject to a fiduci-
ary duty of loyalty to the prospective principal in negotiating the
terms of the agent's compensation.' 5 If the prospective principal
reveals confidential information, then the prospective agent has the
same duties as an actual agent regarding the protection and use of the
information.4 6 There is some support for the proposition that the
agent's fiduciary duty should under some circumstances encompass
pre-agency negotiations.47 Outside of relationships generally recog-
nized to be confidential, like the lawyer-client relationship, it would
be unusual to widen the focal points of the prospective agent's duties.
45. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 390 cmt. e (1958). A lawyer, in con-
trast, has a professional duty to charge only a "reasonable" fee. See Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(a) (1995).
46. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 395 cmt. d. Authority conflicts over
whether client-lawyer agreements reached prior to representation should be treated
as arms-length transactions. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
§ 29A cmt. d, Reporter's Note (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
47. Outside of the context of a recognized confidential relationship like a lawyer-
client relationship, a few cases to date accept this proposition. In Martin r. Heinold
Commodities, Inc., 510 N.E.2d 840 (Ill. 1987), a commodities investor claimed that
information about commissions received from a broker did not fully reveal how fees
were to be used and allocated. See id. at 844. The court held that it was an issue of
fact whether a pre-agency duty attached. See id. The plaintiff prevailed on remand,
and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed on the basis that a pre-agency, fiduciary duty
applied when "the creation of the agency relationship involve[sl peculiar trust and
confidence, with reliance by the principal on the fair dealing by the agent." Martin v.
Heinold Commodities, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 734, 741 (Il1. 1994). Such a finding was not
against the weight of the evidence, the court held, given the complexity of the under-
lying transactions. See id. Martin relies on the Second Restatement of Agency, which
uses only the relationship between a prospective client and a lawyer as the sole illus-
tration of the "peculiar trust and confidence" implicit in the creation of an agency
relationship, such that "the agent is under a duty to deal fairly with the principal in
arranging the terms of the employment." Restatement (Second) of Agency § 390 cmt.
e; see also Kirkruff v. Wisegarver, 697 N.E.2d 406,410-11 (111. App. Ct. 1998) (holding
that the evidence supported a jury finding of a fiduciary relationship between a real
estate broker and the trustee of a land trust (citing Martin, 643 N.E.2d at 741)). In
General Acquisition, Inc v. GenCorp Inc, 766 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D. Ohio 1990), the
plaintiff sued following a collapsed stock acquisition deal, and the defendant inter-
posed a counterclaim alleging breach of fiduciary duty on the part of its financial
advisors, including breach of duties owed a prospective principal by a prospective
agent. The court denied the counterclaim defendants' motion to dismiss, stating that
"under certain circumstances, Ohio courts would recognize that a prospective agent
might owe a fiduciary duty to a prospective principal." Id. at 1474 (relying on the
Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 390 cmt. e, 395 cmt. d).
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In any event, agency's focus is the interests of the principal, not those
of parties outside an agency relationship.48
The distinctiveness of the lawyer's position comes into sharper fo-
cus when contrasted with other professions. Consider the legal frame-
work applicable to the investment bank sued in Walton v. Morgan
Stanley & Co.49 Corporation A retained the bank to represent it in
locating an acquisition target. Corporation B fit the bill and, attracted
by the prospect of a friendly takeover by A, B supplied the bank with
confidential information. B directed that the information be returned
if the transaction with A did not occur. A never made a bid for B.
Instead, Corporation C made a public offer for B. Following C's bid,
the bank's arbitrage department bought shares in B for the bank's
own account. The bank also revealed the confidential information to
another client, Corporation D, to induce D to make a bid at a higher
price than C's price, which D did. The Seventh Circuit held that the
bank owed no fiduciary duty to Corporation B, reasoning that the
bank's client was A, its task was to obtain information with which to
advise A, B never retained the bank, and the bank never had the task
of acting on B's behalf. The court stated that management of the
bank and B "must be presumed to have dealt, absent evidence of an
extraordinary relationship, at arm's length."50 B's entrusting confi-
dential information to the bank in itself created no duty to observe the
confidence,51 for B neglected to insist on a written confidentiality
agreement. In contrast, the Westinghouse court noted that the size of
48. The Restatement (Second) of Agency does not appear to discuss duties that a
prospective agent might owe to a prospective principal if an agency relationship never
results.
49. 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980).
50. Id. at 798.
51. See id. at 799. The activities of the investment bank's risk arbitrage depart-
ment also warrant comment. If the firm's client, A, had an agency relationship with
the firm at the time it bought B shares for the firm's own account, then the firm would
not be free without A's consent to use confidential information it acquired because of
the agency on its own account or to benefit a party other than A. See Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 395. The Supreme Court's recent articulation of principles ra-
tionalizing the law of insider trading relies heavily on this point of agency doctrine.
See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199,2208-11 (1997). In particular, O'Hagan
makes it clear that the prohibition on trading extends to information that, as in Wal-
ton, concerns a corporation other than the client. See id. at 2218-19. Once the agency
terminates, the former agent remains under the same duty regarding use of confiden-
tial information. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 396(c). If challenged on this
score, the bank might argue that the risk arbitrage purchases are explicable other than
by using confidential information acquired in connection with an agency relationship.
A separate agency doctrine prohibits the agent from competing with the principal
"concerning the subject matter of his agency" unless the principal agrees. Id. § 393.
It could be argued that the risk arbitrage purchases compete with the client's purchas-
ing plans for the same security. To the extent the risk arbitrage transactions are large
enough to move the market price upward, the client pays more and, thus, suffers an
identifiable economic injury. The principal's consent to the agent's competition may
be shown through, among other things, a course of dealing indicating that the princi-
pal understood the agent would compete. See id. § 393 cmt. a.
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the law firm and its reputation "would tend to comfort any apprehen-
sions and open the lines of communication,"52 and neither the law
firm nor its litigation client appears to have emphasized the absence of
a written assurance of confidentiality as a factor legitimating the
representations.
The contrast between Walton and Westinghouse suggests that rea-
sonable people have different baseline expectations about what may
happen when confidence is entrusted in a lawyer and in an investment
bank. These generalized expectations shape the reasonableness of be-
lieving that the agent will respect the confidence in the absence of a
formal retention or confidentiality agreement. Courts protect these
expectations even when the lawyer in question is directly retained by
an investment bank. In the Walton scenario, if the investment bank
retained a law firm to assist its work for Corporation A and Corpora-
tion B furnished confidential information to the law firm, then the
absence of a formal confidentiality agreement would not likely allow
the firm to represent interests adverse to B or to trade in securities
based on the information. In Jack Eckerd Corp. v. Dart Group
Corp.,5 3 Corporation A, in connection with an attempted acquisition
of Corporation B, hired an investment bank, which in turn retained a
law firm as counsel. The law firm prepared a memorandum, using
confidential information furnished by A, analyzing the unattractive
situation if A were characterized as an investment company under the
Investment Company Act of 1940.14 The memorandum was sent to
the investment bank, not to A. A abandoned its interest in B, termi-
nated its relationship with the investment bank, and two months later
filed a Schedule 13D disclosing that it had purchased more than five
percent of the shares of Corporation C. Shortly before the filing, C
retained the law firm previously retained by A's investment bank. On
C's behalf, the law firm brought suit challenging the accuracy of A's
disclosure concerning its intentions in investing in C as stated in the
Schedule 13D. C supported its contention by referring to A's difficult
position under the Investment Company Act, which was of course the
focal point of the law firm's work during its earlier retention by A's
investment bank. The court disqualified the law firm from represent-
ing C in the disclosure litigation, holding that an attorney-client rela-
tionship could be formed, and could subsequently be the basis for
disqualifying the lawyer from an adverse representation, when confi-
dential information is furnished to the lawyer in the reasonable belief
that the lawyer is acting as one's attorney. Additionally, the invest-
52. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7th Cir.
1978). In addition, the oil companies reasonably believed in Westinghouse that the
law firm worked for them through the vehicle of the trade association, while Walton's
facts do not suggest a fully comparable belief on the part of Corporation B.
53. 621 F. Supp. 725 (D. Del. 1985).
54. See idL at 728.
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ment bank, in retaining the law firm initially, might have been acting
as Corporation A's agent, which would have created a lawyer-client
relationship directly between the law firm and A, the investment
bank's client.
B. The Mandatory Quality of Loyalty
Within the general law of agency, much of the agent's duty of loy-
alty to the principal is subject to contrary agreement between the
agent and the principal. With the principal's consent, for example, the
agent may self-deal,55 act on behalf of parties with interests adverse to
the principal,56 profit from transactions conducted on behalf of the
principal,57 use the principal's confidential information,5 8 and compete
with the principal.5 9 The scope of this flexibility is not unlimited.61 If
the agent acts on behalf of two principals in a transaction between
them and with their knowledge, then the agent has a duty to "act with
fairness to each" and to disclose information that would reasonably
affect the principals' judgment to permit dual agency. 61 Likewise, an
55. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 389.
56. See id. § 391.
57. See id. § 388.
58. See id. § 395.
59. See id. § 393.
60. An additional limitation stems from uncertainty concerning the effect a court
may give to generalized consents given well in advance of conduct that would other-
wise constitute a breach of the agent's duty of loyalty. See, e.g., Labovitz v. Dolan, 545
N.E.2d 304 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that the general partner's fiduciary duties
exist concurrently with obligations as defined by a partnership agreement where a
provision in the agreement giving the general partner "sole discretion" to make distri-
butions of cash to limited partners did not waive fiduciary constraints on the general
partner's discretion).
In the basic formulation in the Restatement (Second) of Agency, "[u]nless other-
wise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of
the principal in all matters connected with his agency." Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 387. This statement leaves open the requisites of an effective agreement.
One basic question is whether such an agreement should only be effective if made
after the agent's conduct, so that the principal knows with complete particularity what
is being agreed to. This parallels a requirement for effective ratification. Ratification,
a more fully defined concept, requires the principal to know the material facts at the
time of a purported ratification of an agent's unauthorized act. See id. § 91. The
broader and less precise formulation, "unless otherwise agreed," suggests a concept
somewhat distinct from ratification. Id. § 387. It is noteworthy that the Restatement
Second's specific sections dealing with fiduciary duty are prefaced by an introductory
note stating:
[A]lthough the agency relation normally involves a contract between the
parties, it is a special kind of contract, since an agent is not merely a promis-
sor or promisee but is also a fiduciary. Because he is a fiduciary and is sub-
ject to the directions of the principal, the rules as to his duties to the
principal are unique.
Id. ch. 13, introductory note. This appears to place the fiduciary character of the
agent's relation to the principal outside the parties' agreement as an initial matter and
to restrict the impact of the agreement on that character thereafter.
61. Id. § 392.
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agent who self-deals with the principal's knowledge has duties of fair-
ness and disclosure to the principal.6' Any agent, moreover, must in-
terpret statements of authority and instructions from the principal
reasonably and in a manner that serves the principal's interests.
In contrast, the relationship between the lawyer and the client is
less susceptible to an agreement that varies the lawyer's duty of loy-
alty to the client. The lawyer's professional duties cast the lawyer in
many respects as the guardian of the relationship, requiring the lawyer
to use reasonable judgment to identify the client's interests and to ed-
ucate the client as a prelude to the client's consent to otherwise prob-
lematic conduct. In contrast, agency law generally does not
particularize what should constitute or precede the principal's agree-
ment and does not require agents to educate the principal or to assure
that the principal fully understands the import of the agreement.
Consider first the basic question of compensation. A lawyer may
not charge a fee that is not reasonable in the circumstances, 63 whereas
outside of confidential relationships, the compensation of an agent is
governed by the terms of the agent's agreement with the principal.'
In the lawyer-client relationship, some fee arrangements are categori-
cally forbidden, including a lawyer's acquisition of a proprietary inter-
est in the client's cause of action 65 and an outcome-contingent fee to
represent a defendant in a criminal case.66 In agency relationships
more generally, however, it is often desirable for the agent to be com-
pensated with a distinct proprietary interest to better align the agent's
interests with those of the principal, a practice exemplified by the
common use of stock options as an employee compensation device.
Separately, when a lawyer has a conflict of interest, a client's ability
to consent to representation is subject to specific limitations. For ex-
ample, two clients may not consent to representation by the same law-
yer when the consequence would be that one client asserts a claim
against the other in the same litigation.67 In such a scenario, the law-
yer as a dual agent would, as noted above, have a duty to "act with
fairness" toward each client, which to some degree recasts the lawyer
as a judge of the respective deserts of the two clients.' Conflicts may
not be consented to when the lawyer will unlikely be able to provide
62. See iU. § 390.
63. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(a) (1995)- Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 46 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
64. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 390 cmt. e.
65. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 48(1). Because
contingent fees are permissible in most civil litigation, the significance of this prohibi-
tion may be primarily formal. See id. § 47.
66. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(d)(2).
67. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lavyers § 202(2)(b).
68. A separate rationale for the prohibition is "the institutional interest in vigor-
ous development of each client's position .... " Id. § 202 cmt. g(iii).
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adequate representation to one of the clients. 69 This limit protects the
client, to be sure, but it also disables a prospective client from trading
off the value of adequate representation against other interests and
objectives the client may have, such as currying the favor of the other
more advantaged client.7"
Additionally, in conflict scenarios the lawyer's professional duties
require the lawyer to make an initial reasonable determination that
the conflicting representation will not adversely affect the relationship
with the client.7 Even if the client consents to the conflicting repre-
sentation, the lawyer may not undertake it unless the lawyer has ful-
filled the lawyer's duty to protect the client from adverse
consequences of the relationship. In contrast, agency generally does
not impose a comparable limit on an agent's right to propose dual or
conflicting agency relationships. Although an agent who proposes to
undertake an additional agency relationship must disclose information
to the present and prospective principals that would reasonably affect
their judgment to permit the dual agency,7" the general law of agency
does not condition the agent's right to propose a dual agency on an
initial reasonable determination of its impact on the principal's
interests.
These limits on client consent appear to serve a number of distinct
interests. Protecting clients, especially unsophisticated or desperate
ones, against aggressive overreaching is an obvious effect of the "rea-
sonableness" limit on fees. Such clients are also protected by the
specification of nonconsentable conflicts, given the likelihood of dis-
parities in information and problems in monitoring the lawyer. Fur-
thermore, the limits tend to keep the cast of characters in their
assigned roles. A lawyer with a proprietary interest in the "client's"
cause of action is transformed into a holder of a residual interest
equivalent in economic form to the client's that threatens the client's
basis for exercising control over the lawyer.73 A lawyer representing
direct adversaries becomes a judge. Additionally, some restrictions on
the effect of client consent serve to protect the integrity of judicial
institutions. Prohibiting contingent fee representation of criminal de-
fendants is an obvious example of such restrictions. Limiting the ef-
fect of client consent also strengthens the profession's distinct claims
69. See id. § 202(2)(c).
70. One of the illustrations to section 202 of the Restatement posits a buyer and a
seller in a complex transaction in real estate. Although the parties disagree sharply
on important terms and distrust each other, they ask the same lawyer to represent
both of them in negotiating and documenting their transaction. See id. § 202 cmt.
g(iv), illus. 10. An explanation for the request, apart from ignorance or lack of sophis-
tication, is that the party more eager to conclude the deal has acquiesced in the other
party's choice of counsel. The more eager party may distrust the other, but it per-
ceives acquiescence as a useful means toward the desired end.
71. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(a)(1), (b)(1).
72. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 392 (1958).
73. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 48 cmt. b.
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on the lawyer. A conflicted lawyer who represents a client when inad-
equate representation is likely, even with the client's fully informed
consent, is subverting the quality of professional services to serve
whatever agenda may have led the client to consent to the conflicted
representation.
C. Mitigating Agency
The nature of legal institutions, together with the distinctive role of
lawyers within legal institutions, dictates caution in applying agency
principles. For example, despite the general wisdom of binding a cli-
ent to the consequences of representation in litigation, the client's
ability to supervise the lawyer and to assess the lawyer's competence
may be limited, while the lawyer may disregard the client's express
instructions. Suing the lawyer for malpractice is not a complete rem-
edy, given the immediacy of consequences that the initial litigation or
other matter inflicts upon the client.74 Thus, it is not surprising that in
at least some circumstances courts consider whether the lawyer's com-
petence and obedience to the client's instructions should mitigate con-
sequences for the client, despite the client's agency relationship with
the lawyer.75
Legal institutions, moreover, perform functions that on occasion
trump or countermand the implications of agency principles. Con-
sider the position of a lawyer, retained by a client to defend the client
in a lawsuit, who hires an expert witness. Distinguished authority has
74. Additionally, to recover in a malpractice action, the client must establish cau-
sation. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 75 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 2, 1998). This burden is often difficult to meet and, in some circumstances,
generates unusual difficulties. For example, suppose the lawyer is widely believed to
have performed poorly in a court of last resort, such as the United States Supreme
Court. The client's malpractice action would be before a lower court, perhaps a state
rather than a federal court, that would be placed in the position of second-guessing
the impact of written briefs and oral argument on the appellate court's disposition. A
curious side feature of a current dispute involving this scenario was the attempt of
most, but not all, of a lawyer's clients to disavow him as their representative prior to
oral argument before the Court. The Court's clerk used a coin toss to resolve the
dispute between that lawyer and another who represented clients on the same side of
the dispute. See Tony Mauro, Calling a Bad Day in Court Malpractice, Legal Tunes,
July 20, 1998, at 7. Viewed from the perspective of agency law, it is disconcerting that
clients remain at jeopardy due to the actions of a lavyer whose authority they are
known to have terminated. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
§§ 43, 45 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996): see also Case C-78195, Hendrikman v.
Magenta Druck & Verlag G.m.b.H., 1996 E.C.R. 1-4960 (Ct. First Instance) (holding
that a party named as a defendant is not bound by the appearance of a lawyer who
purported to represent the defendant but had never been retained by the defendant).
One might consider that, once the lawyer has been terminated, the lawyer breaches
the agency-grounded duty of obedience to the clients by continuing to purport to
represent them. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 38 cmt. b.
75. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 41. It is, of course,
relevant whether the lawyer's conduct prejudiced an opposing party or the judicial
system. See id § 41 cmt. d.
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opined that, as the lawyer is the client's agent, the expert witness is the
lawyer's agent and thus the client's subagent.76 As a consequence, a
continuous chain of agency links the client, the expert witness, and the
lawyer. While some implications of the chain are sensible, others are
disconcerting. The implications should reflect the function to be
served by retaining the expert. If the expert serves as a consultant
who advises the lawyer, then the attorney-client privilege protects
confidential information that the client reveals to the expert for evalu-
ation so that the lawyer may better prepare the case on behalf of the
client.77 The privilege also extends to confidential communications
between the lawyer and the expert regarding the client.78 Like a law-
yer, moreover, a consulting expert has a loyalty-based duty to the cli-
ent that prohibits the expert from switching sides once a confidential
relationship has been created.79 The client's expectations of confiden-
tiality preclude the consulting expert from serving as a testifying wit-
ness on behalf of an adverse party. In contrast, if the expert's role is
solely to testify, then communications to the expert ordinarily are not
protected by the privilege. 8 The testifying expert is a witness, provid-
ing evidence that lies within the witness's special training and exper-
tise. The expert witness's duty requires frank answers to questions,
even answers adverse to the interests of the client on whose behalf the
witness was retained.8
It is commonly assumed that a testifying expert is an agent of the
lawyer who retains the expert and a subagent of the client.82 This as-
sumption, if accepted without qualification, is treacherous. A defining
element of the common law relationship of agency is the principal's
right to control the agent. As discussed at some length above, 83 "con-
trol" within agency includes the right to give interim instructions and
directions to the agent. The presence of such a right is incompatible
with the institutional expectations of witnesses, including expert wit-
nesses. Characterizing a testifying expert as the retaining lawyer's
agent implies that the lawyer has the right to control the witness's
testimony, perhaps by instructing the witness how to answer questions
and whether to answer questions asked by the adversary's lawyer.
76. See City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 231 P.2d 26, 31 (Cal.
1951); ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
97-407 (1997).
77. See Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. Division of Bldg. & Constr., 405 A.2d 487, 490
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979). Likewise, opinions generated by consulting experts
are conditionally protected as lawyer work product from discovery. See id. at 492.
78. See id. at 490.
79. See Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271, 280-81 (S.D. Ohio
1988).




83. See supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text.
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This right is inconsistent with the witness's duty to testify truthfully as
to the witness's own opinions and knowledge. At a minimum, the wit-
ness assumes duties to the court, articulated in the oath the witness
takes, that supersede the claims of agency on the witness.
Separately, the common assumption carries liability implications for
the lawyer. If the expert is the lawyer's agent, then the lawyer is re-
sponsible for the quality of the expert's performance to the client. s'
Even if the witness is not the lawyer's agent, an aggrieved client may
argue that the lawyer owed the client a nondelegable duty of care in
connection with the expert's testimony, such that the lawyer is liable
for the expert's negligence, comparable to a lawyer's nondelegable
duty to assure that legal process is properly served on behalf of a cli-
ent. 5 This argument should fail because the lawyer, in undertaking to
represent the client, does not undertake to testify as an integral part of
the lawyer's own work. The lawyer's duty should be limited to the
exercise of care in selecting and preparing the expert.
III. THE AUTHOR, THE TOUT, AND THE SCRIVENER
Within agency relationships, liability, like knowledge, imputes up-
ward from the agent to the principal. When wrongful conduct toward
a third party occurs in connection with an agency relationship, the dis-
pute often focuses on whether a principal is liable for the agent's
wrongful conduct. In contrast, consider circumstances under which an
agent might in some sense be accountable for a wrong committed at
least in part by the principal. These circumstances are relatively unu-
sual. Suppose the agent innocently repeats a defamatory statement
made to the agent by the principal, a statement that the principal
knows to be false. Suppose that the agent is not a lawyer and, in any
event, does not repeat the principal's statement as a witness or a party
in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. As noted above, agency
does not impute the principal's knowledge downward to the agent.
The agent is the instrument of the principal's defamation, but lacks
the requisite state of mind that is a defining element of the tort. When
the question is the agent's individual liability for wrongful conduct,
84. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 5(1) (1958) (defining subagency and its
consequences for agent). A separate question is whether the law;yer is liable for the
expert's fee. The lawyer might characterize the role played as merely that of an agent
for a disclosed principal who did not separately agree to become liable on the contract
with the expert. The expert would argue that the retention was accepted in reliance
on the lawyer's credit. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
§ 42(2)(b) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996). For a thorough discussion, see John H.
Minan & William H. Lawrence, The Personal Liability of an Attorney for Erpert Wit-
ness Fees in California: Understanding Contract Principles aird Agency Theory, 34 San
Diego L. Rev. 541 (1997).
85. See Kleeman v. Rheingold, 614 N.E.2d 712, 717 (N.Y. 1993) (holding that the




the law of agency itself does not fully answer the question, except by
making it clear that the agent's position as an agent does not consti-
tute a defense to conduct that is tortious or criminal.86 An agent who
repeats the principal's defamatory statement, knowing it to be false, is
not immune from liability for defamation simply by virtue of being an
agent.87 In addition, the agent does not acquire immunity by acting in
a relatively ministerial capacity, such as serving as a secretary or scriv-
ener to the principal.88
It is important to have these basic points in mind in assessing the
circumstances under which lawyers are accountable for their clients'
fraudulent misrepresentations. Current controversy focuses on the ac-
countability of securities lawyers in this connection. One basis of con-
siderable confusion is the belief that the securities lawyer who drafts
offering documents is not liable even if the lawyer knows they mis-
state material facts, so long as the lawyer can be characterized as not
functioning as an agent of the lawyer's client. The argument might be
that the lawyer is not an agent because the client has authorized the
lawyer only to draft the documents, not to represent the client in liti-
gation or to commit the client in transactions with third parties.8 9 This
argument mistakenly treats one of the legal consequences of agency as
a defining element in the relationship of agent to principal. Addition-
ally, it ignores the breadth of agency's legal consequences. Suppose
the lawyer's work encompasses drafting a registration statement and a
prospectus on behalf of an issuer of securities for an offering subject
to the Securities Act of 1933. If the registration statement misstates or
omits material facts, then section 11 of the statute imposes strict liabil-
ity on the issuer, regardless of the identity of the person who drafted
the registration statement and regardless of that person's state of
mind or moral culpability. Thus, the lawyer's lack of authority to
commit the client to contracts, or to negotiate with third parties on the
client's behalf, does not mean that the lawyer's acts carry no legal con-
sequences for the client. Moreover, information or knowledge that a
lawyer acquires in connection with a representation imputes to the
86. See Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 343, 359A.
87. See Park Knoll Assocs. v. Schmidt, 451 N.E.2d 182, 184-85 (N.Y. 1983). To be
sure, the speech of a lawyer-agent in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding may be
immune. See id. at 184.
88. See id.
89. One author writes:
Clients hire securities attorneys for their knowledge of complex securities
laws, especially the copious rules regarding how a prospectus must be con-
structed. But, because the attorney who drafts the prospectus is not gener-
ally given the authority to alter legal relations with third parties, the
prospectus is not the product of an "agency" relationship in any meaningful
sense of the word.
Ben D. Orlanski, Comment, Whose Representations Are These Anyway? Attorney
Prospectus Liability After Central Bank, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 885, 933-34 (1995) (foot-
notes omitted).
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client for many, if not all, purposes, even when the lawyer lacks au-
thority to commit the client to contracts. 90
The infirmities of this argument aside, it would not support the con-
clusion that a nonagent lawyer cannot be liable for fraudulent misrep-
resentations that appear in the lawyer's written work product. The
lawyer's liability, that is, does not turn on whether the lawyer is an
agent, but on whether the lawyer's conduct and state of mind suffice
to constitute fraud. What the constituent elements might be for fraud
under the federal securities laws is open to some question after the
Supreme Court's opinion in Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank.91 In
Central Bank, the Court held that neither the language of section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act nor the overall legislative
scheme supported liability in private actions for collateral participants
in fraud whose role was characterized as simply aiding and abetting
the acts of the primary violator. The court emphasized "that the stat-
ute prohibits only the making of a material misstatement (or omis-
sion) or the commission of a manipulative act."'
Recent cases illustrate the variety of scenarios in which the disposi-
tive question is whether a lawyer's conduct should be characterized as
making a misrepresentation for purposes of liability in a private action
for securities fraud. In Klein v. Boyd, the lawyer had a significant role
in drafting offering documents, determining what to include and what
to exclude, and knew that the documents did not contain information
that would be important to prospective investors.93 The investor-
plaintiffs, however, were unaware of the lawyer's role because the
lawyer did not sign or endorse the documents. Klein thus raises the
question of how visible the lawyer's role must be to constitute a mis-
representation that the lawyer makes to investors. Otherwise, Klein
illustrates a lawyer in an authorial role, deciding what the client's
statement to investors shall contain.
Lawyers' efforts in securities transactions are not necessarily con-
fined to generating written documentation. In Rubin v. Schottenstein,
90. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 40(1) (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1996). The Second Restatement of Agency provides another
example:
A is employed by P to report upon the title to Blackacre and to tell him of
any secret equities which he may discover. A discovers that T has an equity
in Blackacre, but negligently fails to report this to P, who accordingly buys
Blackacre from B. P is affected by A's knowledge.
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 272, illus. 4.
91. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). For an insightful and comprehensive treatment of this
case and its implications, see James D. Cox, Just Deserts for Accountants and Attor-
neys After Bank of Denver, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 519 (1996).
92. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 177.
93. See Klein v. Boyd, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 90,136 (3d Cir. Feb.
12, 1998), vacated on grant of reh'g en banc, Nos. 97-1143, 97-1261, 1998 WVL 55245 (3d
Cir. Mar. 9, 1998).
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Zox & Dunn,94 the client referred prospective investors with questions
about the client's financial stability to the lawyer, having dissuaded
the prospective investors from making direct contact with the client's
lender. 95 The lawyer assured the prospective investors that the client
was financially sound and that it had no problems with the lender,
which according to the lawyer would increase funding following a cash
infusion from the investors.96 The lawyer also dissuaded the investors
from contacting the lender directly and subsequently asked the inves-
tors' lawyer not to do so, repeating assurances of the client's financial
health to the investors' lawyer.97 The lawyer, however, told neither
the investors nor their lawyer that his client was already in default
under its loan agreement with the lender and that the proposed invest-
ment would itself constitute a default under the agreement.98 The
court held that these omissions made the lawyer's statements mislead-
ing.99 This conclusion does not conflict with the lawyer's duties of
confidentiality to the client. The lawyer had no right or duty to volun-
teer information about his client, but once having undertaken to
speak, the lawyer's duty was to provide complete and nonmisleading
information. In Rubin, the lawyer was the author of the statements he
made, functioning almost as a tout on behalf of the client.' 0
Securities lawyers have on occasion argued that they function, not
as authors or touts, but as the client's mere scriveners, drafting the
substantive content of the prospectus virtually at the client's dictation,
papering the deal but not independently making statements or repre-
sentations to investors. In Schatz v. Rosenberg,01 the court endorsed
the "mere scrivener" doctrine, stating that "lawyers do not vouch for
the probity of their clients when they draft documents reflecting their
clients' promises, statements, or warranties."'" As agents, the court
held, lawyers are not automatically liable for the client's misrepresen-
tations.0 3 Schatz preceded Central Bank, which more broadly ex-
cluded rationales for liability that did not involve direct acts of
misstatement or commission by a particular defendant. In any event,
whether a lawyer-as-scrivener is liable for fraud is not answered by
agency principles, which establish only that an agent's position is in
itself not a defense. 1' 4





99. See id. at 270.
100. See id. at 265-66.
101. 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991).
102. Id. at 495.
103. See id.
104. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 348 (1958).
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It may be helpful to consider the other context in which the lawyer-
as-scrivener argument surfaces. In Griffith v. Taylor,05 an associate
lawyer in a law firm prepared quitclaim deeds for property at the re-
quest of a grantee, A. The firm subsequently prepared deeds for the
initial grantor, B, deeding the property to him. After the deeds to B
were found to be invalid, the initial grantee, A, sued the firm for mal-
practice, alleging that its work for both A and B constituted a conflict
of interest and a breach of its duty of loyalty to him." 6 The court held
that, although the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for
the firm on the point, the firm might be protected by a scrivener's
exception to its general duty of loyalty to its clients."m The exception
is available when a lawyer "merely fashions a statutory form of deed,
or performs other clerical or ministerial tasks."'' s The exception be-
comes unavailable, however, if the lawyer furnishes any legal advice
to the client, in any way makes use of legal skills, or receives any con-
fidences from the client. 10 9 Even a narrowly-drawn scrivener's excep-
tion is vulnerable to the argument that it conflicts with the loyalty that
all lawyers owe to clients, however humble the specific task that the
lawyer is engaged to perform." 0 The exception may reflect an era of
limited literacy in which lawyers commonly served as amanuenses for
people who could not use language in any written form.' In the con-
temporary world, circumstances contemplated by the exception may
be ones in which, rather than needing a lawyer, the clients need a
computer and some basic software.
In contrast, the work of securities lawyers, however technical, is
neither ministerial nor rote in nature. Drafting a prospectus involves
making judgments and giving advice, both tasks that require access to
confidential information. Nor is it the case that the lawyer has no
choice other than to draft a prospectus to include statements that the
lawyer knows to be false. A lawyer is not a piece of computer hard-
ware that, functioning properly, always obeys correctly-formulated
commands. Instead, recall the best-known legal scrivener, the fic-
tional Bartleby in Herman Melville's short story. Bartleby responded
to his employer's requests by stating that he "would prefer not to. 112
105. 937 P.2d 297 (Alaska 1997).
106. See iU. at 299-300.
107. See id. at 305.
108. Id
109. See id. at 306.
110. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 122 cmt. c (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 1, 1987).
111. See id.
112. Herman Melville, Bartleby, the Scrivener, in The Writings of Herman Melville:




Sad though Bartleby's situation is revealed to be as the story plays
out, he is not an automaton."
13
CONCLUSION
Although lawyers serve their clients as agents, the general law of
agency is often just a starting point for analyzing the legal conse-
quences of lawyer-client relationships. Lawyers owe duties to a cast
of characters wider than that defined by general agency principles,
while the content of duties that lawyers owe their clients is distinctive.
Moreover, the fact that a lawyer acts as the client's agent is irrelevant
when the question is the lawyer's individual liability for the lawyer's
personal participation in fraud, including fraud implicating the law-
yer's client.
113. Bartleby raises numerous challenges in interpretation, insightfully explored in
Robin West, Invisible Victims: A Comparison of Susan Glaspell's Jury of Her Peers
and Herman Melville's Bartleby the Scrivener, 8 Cardozo Stud. L. & Literature 203
(1996).
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